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This paper studies the general equilibrium implications of two types of educa-
tion policy in an overlapping generations growth model with second-best policy.
We examine vouchers, which augment inherited private education spending, and
public investment on economy-wide human capital, that provides economy-wide
externalities to individual human capital accumulation. The government deter-
mines jointly the allocation of tax revenues among the two types of education
policy and tax policy, subject to the competitive decentralized equilibrium. Using
plausible parameter values it is shown that it is socially optimal to spend heavily
on economy-wide human capital accumulation and ﬁnance government spending
by a modest proportional tax on initial human capital and a low tax on inherited
private education expenditures.
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mine.1 Introduction
In Europe, North America and other countries, there is an ongoing debate on
potential ways of ﬁnancing activities that have public good characteristics and
involve positive externalities, since competitive equilibria are typically ineﬃcient
in such cases.
We focus on education policy, because since the work of Lucas (1988) hu-
man capital accumulation has been identiﬁed as a fundamental source of long-run
growth in modern economies and we have seen signiﬁcant government interven-
tion in the funding and provision of education worldwide (e.g Gradstein et al.,
2000, Thum et al., 2003). In most countries, primary and secondary education
are mandatory and provided by the government and higher education is heavily
subsidized (e.g by deducting educational spending from taxable income).
Education can be viewed as a mechanism of intergenerational transfers1 ,s i n c e
it typically takes place at the beginning of the life cycle and it is ﬁnanced by re-
sources transfered from the old geneneration. These transfers are altruistically
motivated, but aﬀect economic growth, income distribution and welfare through
their impact on human capital accumulation (see e.g Lucas, 1988, Azariadis et al,
1990, Barro et al., 1995, Barro 2001, De la Croix et al., 2002). Altruistic decisions
yield typically ineﬃcient outcomes and parental decisions regarding children’s edu-
cation, which ignore the positive impact of individual human capital accumulation
on the aggregate production, are a classic example of such decisions.
We use an overlapping generations model where human capital accumulation
is the engine of long-run growth and relies on private and public investment, initial
human capital and time devoted to education. Regarding welfare, members of the
old generation have a bequest motive2 and value education transfers to the next
1Roughly 5% of GDP is transferred to the young generation through public education in the
OECD countries (see Thum et al., 2003).
2Generally, reasons for bequests are altruism on behalf of the parents, provision of inventives
1generation 3 as well as consumption and leisure (Zilcha, 2003).
Regarding education policy, a benevolent ﬁscal authority uses distortionary
income taxes to augment human capital accumulation by the provision of educa-
tional vouchers (EV) and direct education spending (GH). The allocation of public
human capital expenditures among the above two outlays and the associated tax
rate are chosen optimally by the ﬁscal authority, which maximizes the utility of
the representative old agent and remain ﬁxed once they are determined.
The basic result of the paper is that it is optimal to undertake high direct
education spending and ﬁnance it by a modest proportional income tax and a low
tax on inherited education transfers, i.e negative education vouchers.
This work is related to three strands of literature. First, it complements the
literature on endogenous growth and human capital accumulation (see e.g Lu-
cas 1988, Azariadis et al., 1990). Second, it is related to research, which tries
to explain the widespread public provision and ﬁnancing of education as a way
to indoctrinate and instill social norms and values e.g reducing the rent-seeking
incentives between competitive groups of heterogeneous agents (Gradstein 2000,
Gradstein et al., 2000, 2002, Thum et al, 2003). Third, this work is relevant to
the large and diverse literature on alternative ways of ﬁnancing education (see for
example Glomm et al., 1992, Zhang 1996, Epple et al., 1998, Kaganovich et al.,
1999, Meier, 2000, Soares 2003).
However, this paper studies an environment where both private and public
education spending exist, while other authors (e.g Glomm et al., 1992, Zhang,
1996, Cardak, 1999) analyze the private and public education regimes separately.
such that their heirs behave according to what parents believe is appropriate and accidental
death of retired individuals who are not able to buy actuarially fair annuities. Besides that, in
the absence of a bequest motive it would be diﬃcult to explain why even very wealthy individuals
maintain large asset balances at death (Azariadis, 1993).
3Education quality received by the children is assumed to be determined solely by parental
funding.
2We also use a richer human capital accumulation speciﬁcation including time
devoted to education, two forms of public education spending, private education
expenditures and parental human capital than other studies (e.g Kaganovich et al.,
1999 and Cardak, 1999). We also include private education transfers directly in
the utility function and assume that agents put diﬀerent weight to the components
of utility, in contrast with most of the literature (e.g Glomm et al., 1992, Cardak,
1999, Zhang 1996). Finally, we endogenize the tax rate, that is sometimes taken
as exogenous, (see e.g Kaganovich et al., 1999).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 solves for the competitive de-
centralized equilibrium. Section 3 solves for the optimal revenue shares of the
two types of public education spending and the associated tax rate and conducts
sensitivity analysis with respect to the most important parameters of the model.
Section 4 concludes the paper. Technical details are contained in the Appendices.
2 Education Policy and Competitive Equilibrium
2.1 Theoretical framework
Consider an overlapping generations economy populated by N two-period-lived
agents. In the second period of life each individual gives birth to another, so
population growth is zero.4 Each generation consists of identical individuals, so
it is characterized by a representative agent. Agents derive utility from leisure
when young and consumption and education spending (education quality) passed
on to the next generation when old. This formulation is standard in the literature
(see also Glomm et al., 1992, Zhang, 1996, Cardak 1999, Kaganovich et al., 1999).
One unit of time is available to each individual in every period. During the ﬁrst
period, time is allocated to leisure and human capital accumulation, while in the
4For an examination of the impact of variable population growth on economic growth see
e.g. Futagami et al, 2001.
3second period all time is supplied in the labour market.
The two generations alive in every period (i.e young and old) are linked through
two channels. First, the stock of human capital of the parents aﬀects children’s
learning. This reﬂects the fact that a young individual inherits partially the hu-
man capital of the parents, i.e there is intergenerational transmission of ability
and knoweledge within the family that does not work through formal school-
ing. Parental human capital might also aﬀect children’s human capital through
the quality of parental tutoring. The second linkage between generations exists
through bequests; in our model the bequest is education spending passed on to
the next generation, since parents value human capital transfers to their oﬀspring.
This reﬂects education-inclined altruism on behalf of the parents and is referred
in the literature as "joy of giving" (or "warm glove"), since parents have a taste
for giving (Wigger, 2001, De la Croix at al, 2002).
Education policy operates through two types of government expenditures ﬁ-
nanced by taxes on private agents’ initial human capital. First, government
provides education vouchers which are added to inherited parental spending on
schooling (EV), e.g student scholarships, teaching and research assistantships or
money permitting parents to send their children to private schools. Second, ﬁscal
authorities incur direct education spending, which provides economy-wide ex-
ternalities to individual human capital accumulation (GH), e.g public programs
for libraries, expenditures on building schools, teachers’ and university profes-
sors’ salaries and training. Both GH and EV work as inputs to private human
capital formation by complementing private inputs. A possible interpretation of
the simultaneous presence of private and public human capital expenditures in
the production of human capital is that the majority of public education spend-
ing ﬁnances primary and secondary education, while private expenditure ﬁnances
mainly tertiary education and on the job-training (Blankenau et al., 2004).
4In an nutshell, individual human capital depends on time devoted to schooling,
parental education spending, parental stock of human capital net of taxes, direct
public education expenditures and government spending on education vouchers.
Events take place in two stages. First, a centralized ﬁscal authority chooses
the tax rate and the allocation of the associated revenues among the two types of
education policy, then private agents choose consumption, education spending on
their children and leisure (therefore time devoted to education) given economic
policy.
2.2 Household behaviour
Solving the problem backwards, in the second stage, the representative agent
born in period t chooses ct+1,n t and et+1 taking educational vouchers, public in-
vestment, which provides economy-wide externalities to individual human capital
accumulation and the income tax rate as given to maximize the lifetime utility
function:
aln(nt)+l n( ct+1)+bln(et+1) (1)
subject to
ht+1 = ct+1 + et+1 (2)
ht+1 = A(1 − nt)
β (et + vt+1)
γ G
ζ
t+1 [(1 − τt+1)ht]
δ (3)
where nt ∈ [0,1] is leisure in period t, ct+1,e t+1 are respectively consumption,
education expenditures in period t+1.5 Parameter a represents the preference for
5Regarding human capital accumulation, empirical studies show that the quality of education,
measured e.g by the student/teacher ratio, term length or relative pay of teachers, inﬂuences
positively the rate of return of individuals to education, therefore their future income (see Card et
al., 1992). Also, the empirical work shows a positive correlation between parental knowledge and
5leisure. The last element of the utility function reﬂects the ad hoc altruism, i.e "joy
of giving". The utility from leaving a bequest depends on the size of the bequest.
So, b is the altruism factor reﬂecting the degree of parental altruism towards
children expressed via education transfers to the oﬀspring. These parameters are
assumed to be constant over time, i.e all generations of every family give the same
weight to nt and et+1.
Also, ht+1 is human capital in period t +1 , ht and et are predetermined and
stand for human capital and inherited private education spending in period t. As
for vt+1 and Gt+1, they stand for EV, GH respectively and τt+1 is the uniform
proportional tax rate on initial human capital. Finally, A is a technological pa-
rameter that stands for total factor productivity in the human capital formation
technology and β,γ,δ,ζ exhibit the elacticities of the learning process with regard
to time devoted to education, inherited private education spending adjusted for
education vouchers (EV), after-tax human capital and government spending on
economy-wide human capital (GH) respectively.
Given that agents supply one unit of labour inelastically in period t +1 , ht+1
s t a n d sf o ri n c o m ea n dt h ew a g er a t e .E q u a tion (2) is the budget constraint of the
representative household and states that net human capital (disposable income) is
devoted to consumption and education bequests to the decendants. Relation (3) is
a Cobb-Douglas production function for human capital, according to which human
capital accumulation depends positively on time devoted to schooling (1 − ni,t),
initial education spending supplemented by education vouchers (et + vt+1), public
spending on economy-wide human capital, Gt+1, and income in period t adjusted
child performance in school (see Glomm et al., 1992), parental schooling and children‘s schooling
(e.g Plug, 2004), parental income and children’s income (De la Croix et al, 2002), parents‘ income
and human capital investments (see Grossmann, 2003). In our paper human capital is the only
source of income, therefore modelling human capital investment as a function of parents‘ human
capital seems reasonable. Furthermore, time spent on human capital investment is expected to
have a positive eﬀect on school performance.
6for taxes, [(1 − τt+1)ht],w h e r eA>0 and β,γ,δ,ζ ∈ (0,1), so that all factors
exhibit diminishing returns.
Conditions (2) and (3) imply that
ct+1 + et+1 = A(1 − nt)
β (et + vt+1)
γ G
ζ
t+1 [(1 − τt+1)ht]
δ (4)
























t+1 [(1 − τt+1)ht]
δ (8)
Equation (5) implies that time devoted to education is constant in equilib-
rium and independent of initial human capital and education expenditures, since
the income and substitution eﬀects of changes in et and ht balance each other
perfectly.7
Proposition 1 By partial diﬀerentiation of (5)-(8) with respect to a,b,A,β,γ,δ,ζ,
we get:
a) Time devoted to education is a negative function of the preferences over
leisure (a) and a positive function of the degree of parental altruism towards chil-
dren (b) and the elasticity of future human capital with respect to the time spent
on education (β).The inverse holds for leisure.
6The second-order conditions are also satisﬁed if et > 2.1, which is reasonable given that the
baseline value for ht =1 0(see below).
7This holds due to log-linear preferences.
7b) Consumption and education transfers in period t +1depend positively on
human capital in t +1( ht+1) and education expenditures increase with parental
preferences over children‘s education quality (b).
c) Human capital in period t+1depends positively on the intensity of parental
altruism (b), total factor productivity with regard to human capital accumulation,
the elasticities of the process of human capital evolution with respect to education
expenditures (γ), net initial human capital (δ) and direct government education
spending (ζ). Besides these, human capital in t +1is a negative function of the
elasticity of human capital formation with respect to time devoted to education (β)
and the preference parameter for leisure (a).
2.3 Government budget constraint
The government runs a balanced budget. It uses revenues from proportional tax-
ation of initial human capital and allocates them between two types of spending,
i.e. educational vouchers (vt+1) and expenditures on economy-wide human capital
(Gt+1) keeping their respective shares in total government spending as ﬁxed.
Given that there are N private agents, the government budget constraint is:
Nvt+1 + Gt+1 = τt+1Nht (9)
Without loss of generality, we denote the shares of total tax revenues ﬁnancing
Nvt+1,G t+1 as k1,k 2, where
k2 =1− k1 (10)
respectively. Thus (9) can be decomposed into:
Nvt+1 = k1τt+1Nht (11)
8Gt+1 =( 1− k1)τt+1Nht (12)
Equations (9)-(12) imply that economic policy is summarized by (k1,τt+1).
2.4 Competitive decentralized equilibrium
Given the policy vector (k1,τt+1), the Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium
(CDE) is deﬁned as the set of allocations (nt,c t+1,e t+1,ht+1,k1,τt+1) such that:
(i) households maximize utility given economic policy; (ii) markets clear; (iii)
the government budget constraint is satisﬁe d . W ew i l lm a k eu s eo ft h es p e c i ﬁc
functional forms and try to obtain closed-form solutions for the elements of the
CDE.






Gt+1 =( 1− k1)τt+1Nht (14)
Proposition 2 By (5)-(8) and (13)-(14) we have the following result:
In a symmetric competitive decentralized equilibrium (given any economic pol-
icy), optimal leisure, consumption, education transfers, individual human capital,






8This assumption is reasonable, since we focus on the optimal allocation of tax revenues
between the two types of public education spending on eﬃciency grounds and not on inequality












































t+1 [(1 − τt+1)ht]
δ (18)
vt+1 = k1τt+1ht (19)
Gt+1 =( 1− k1)τt+1Nht (20)
This holds for any ﬁscal policy, where the latter is represented by the allocation
of tax revenues between educational vouchers vt+1, expenditures on economy-
wide human capital Gt+1 and income tax rate τt+1. In the next section, we will
endogenize the choice of vt+1, Gt+1 and τt+1,.
3 Optimal Economic Policy
To endogenize economic policy, it is suﬃcient to determine the independent policy
instruments (k1,τt+1). So, we consider a centralized ﬁscal authority, that chooses
the fraction of total tax revenues devoted to educational vouchers (k1) and a
uniform tax rate τt+1. This authority acts as a benevolent Stackelberg leader
vis-a-vis the private sector by taking into account the competitive decentralized
equilibrium.
As a result, the problem consists in choosing (k1,τt+1), which maximize the
utility of the representative household given in (1). Substituting (15)-(20) into
10(1) and diﬀerentiating with respect to k1,τt+1 the ﬁrst-order conditions are the
following:9
















By solving (21)-(22) for the optimal policy vector (k1,τt+1), we get the fol-
lowing:
k1 =
γ + b(γ − δ − ζ)
γ + ζ + b(γ − δ + ζ)
(23)
τt+1 =
γ + ζ + b(γ − δ + ζ)
(1 + b)(γ + δ + ζ)
(24)
Therefore, the portion of tax revenues devoted to education vouchers (k1) and
the optimal (second-best) tax rate (τt+1) a r ec o n s t a n to v e rt i m ea n dd e p e n do nt h e
parental preference intensity over children‘s education quality (b) and the elactici-
ties of future human capital with regard to: a) education expenditures bequethed
by the parents to their descendants adjusted for vouchers (γ);b )a f t e r - t a xh u -
man capital (δ); c) public spending, which provides economy-wide externalities to
individual human capital accumulation (ζ).
In order to obtain numerical values for the second-best policy (k1,τt+1), we
need values for b, γ, δ, ζ, which for γ, δ, ζ are chosen from Benhabib et al,1994,
Psaharopoulos,1985, Card et al., 1996, Magoula et al.,1997 and Acemoglou et
al.,1999. The value for b is selected so that individuals put more weight on con-
sumption, education transfers to their oﬀspring and leisure sequentially. Thus,
the baseline parameter values are b =0 .5,γ=0 .15,δ=0 .35,ζ=0 .15. As a
9The second-order conditions of the problem are outlined in Appendix A.
11result, the elements of the policy vector are calculated as τt+1 =0 .28,k 1 = −0.09,
therefore k2 =1 .09 by (10). The negative value of k1 m e a n st h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
must impose a tax on private education transfers. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 3 It is socially optimal to spend heavily on activities that display
positive economy-wide externalities on human capital accumulation and ﬁnance
these expenditures by a modest proportional tax on initial human capital and a
low tax on private inherited education spending.
This result is expected, because direct education spending implies economy-
wide externalities on human capital accumulation, therefore growth, while edu-
cation vouchers display no external eﬀects. However, since vouchers are growth-
enhancing too, government can not levy high taxes on inherited education spend-
ing, i.e highly negative vouchers, and must ﬁnance expenditure on economy-wide
human capital formation mostly by distortionary taxes on private agents’ initial
human capital. Finally, the optimal policy mix is contigent on the fact that we
examine symmetric equilibria, so only production eﬃeciency and not income dis-
tribution matters.
4D y n a m i c s
In this part of our work, we study the dynamics of the economy as reﬂected in
human capital accumulation. To achieve this, we combine (18)-(20), (23)-(24) to















γ + b(γ − δ − ζ)




(1 + b)(γ + δ + ζ)
¸δ+ζ
(26)
12From this law of motion we establish conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of the steady-state income.
Proposition 4 i) If γ + δ + ζ ∈ (0,1), the economy converges monotonically
to a steady state human capital hs = B
1
1−γ−δ−ζ, which is independent of initial
human capital, ii) If γ +δ +ζ =1 , there is no steady state human capital and the
economy displays endogenous growth or decay equal to B. There are three subcases:
a) B =1 . We have ht+1 = ht and the economy stays at the initial human capital
level, b) B<1. Then ht+1 <h t and there is monotonic convergence toward a
steady state human capital equal to 0, c) B>1. There is no steady state and the
economy exhibits long-run growth, iii) If γ +δ + ζ>1, the economy converges to
one of two equilbria, hs =0or hs = B
1
1−γ−δ−ζ, depending on initial conditions, i.e
the equilibria are unstable.
Proof. The above ﬁndings follow directly from the law of motion (25).
As a result, the dynamics of our economy allow for a variety of growth paths




After having computed the shares of spending on economy-wide human capital
accumulation and education vouchers in total government expenditure and the
associated income tax rate, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the optimal policy
vector (k1,τt+1) with regard to the model‘s parameters, i.e b, γ, δ, ζ.W e a l s o
calculate the value of the voucher (vt+1) and spending on economy-wide human
capital (Gt+1) corresponding to each parameter value. Speciﬁcally, we change
the value of one parameter at a time and compute the respective value of the
policy instrument of interest. The ranges of the parameter values are chosen so
that they cover the whole range of empirically plausible values, i.e b ∈ [0.29,0.8],
13Figure 1: Sensitivity of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G t+1) wrt b


































γ ∈ [0.05,0.25],δ∈ [0.25,0.45],ζ∈ [0.05,0.25].The results are presented in
Figures 1-4 below (the respective tables are shown in Appendix B).
From Figure 1, we observe that as b increases, k1 declines, therefore k2 in-
creases. This is because the stronger the parental preference over education be-
quests, the larger the portion of government expenditures the agents would like to
be devoted to spending on economy-wide human capital (GH), because it has a
stronger positive impact on human capital accumulation than education vouchers
(EV). As a result, the optimal share of education vouchers in public spending is
smaller. Also, as b rises, the optimal tax rate falls, because the higher share
of funding devoted to GH increases human capital for given values of the rest
of productive inputs allowing for a lower tax rate to raise the necessary rev-
enues. In addition, vt+1 falls when b rises, because both k1 and τt+1 decrease
(vt+1 = k1τt+1ht by (19)). On the other hand, Gt+1 rises because k2 (= 1 − k1)
r i s e sm o r et h a nτt+1 falls (Gt+1 =( 1− k1)τt+1Nht by (20)). So, economies with
high degree of education-inclined altruism towards the young, are expected to
14Figure 2: Sensitivity of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G t+1) wrt γ
































have low vouchers, high direct education spending and low taxes.
In Figure 2, we note that both k1 and τ are increasing functions of γ, so k2
is a negative function of γ.This is because a higher γ implies higher productivity
of eduvation vouchers relative to direct education spending making it optimal
to devote a larger fraction of government spending to EV, therefore a smaller
fraction to GH. However, the productivity of vouchers remains lower than that of
direct expenditure implying a smaller tax base ceteris paribus, so a rise of the tax
rate is necessary to ﬁnance the higher voucher spending. So, when γ rises, vt+1
increases, because both k1,τt+1 increase, but Gt+1 falls because k2 declines more
than τ rises. As a result, economies with human capital sensitive to individual-
speciﬁc education spending, will be characterized by high educational vouchers,
low expenditures on economy-wide human capital and high tax rates.
By Figure 3, we see that there is negative relation between both k1,τt+1 and
δ. This happens because, a higher δ means that both direct educational and
v o u c h e re x p e n d i t u r e sb e c o m el e s sp r o d u c t i v ec o m p a r e dt oi n i t i a lh u m a nc a p i t a l ,
15Figure 3: Sensitivity of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G t+1) wrt δ






























s ot h e r em u s tb ead e c l i n ei nt h et a xr a t eo nh u m a nc a p i t a lt op r o m o t ek n o w l e d g e
accumulation. The component of public spending, which is less productive (EV)
takes a lower share of government spending, so the opposite holds for spending
on economy-wide human capital. Also, the optimal voucher declines when δ rises,
since both k1,τt+1 fall and direct public education investment falls too, since
the increase in k2 less than conpensates for the fall in τt+1 (see (19)-(20)). As a
consequence, economies with highly sensitive human capital wrt net initial human
capital, will be experiencing low education vouchers, low spending on economy-
wide human capital and low taxes.
In Figure 4, we point out that k1 is a negative function of ζ and τt+1 is a positive
function of ζ. This is because a rise in the elasticity of future human capital with
regard to public spending on economy-wide human capital makes it optimal to
devote a larger share of government spending on this type of expenditure, which
implies a lower fraction going to vouchers. But, since the rise in the share of direct
education spending is higher than the fall in the fraction of vouchers, a higher tax
16Figure 4: Sensitivity of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G t+1) wrt ζ

































rate is necessary to keep the budget balanced. Finally, vt+1 declines with the
rise in ζ,s i n c et h ef a l lo fk1 more than oﬀsets the increase in τt+1,b u tGt+1rises,
because both k2 and τt+1 increase by (19)-(20). As a consequence, economies with
education technology sensitive wrt education spending on economy-wide human
capital, will be experiencing low education vouchers, large spending on economy-
wide human capital and high tax rates.
Finally, total government spending changes in the same direction with τt+1,
w h e np a r a m e t e rv a l u e sv a r y ,s i n c ei ti se q u a lt oτt+1Nht. So, spending on educa-
tion increases when human capital accumulation is more elastic with respect to
individual-speciﬁc education spending (et + vt+1) and public spending on economy-
wide human capital (Gt+1) and falls in case preferences over education quality (b)
strengthen and the elasticity of future human capital with regard to initial human
capital (δ) rises.
175.2 Endogenous variables
The sensitivity analysis presented above implies that the policy instruments may
take positive as well as negative values depending on the underlying parameter
values. This was not taken into account in Proposition 1, where it was e.g im-
plicitly assumed that k1 > 0,v t+1 > 0. So, the ﬁndings outlined there are not
conclusive with respect to the response of human capital, consumption and pri-
vate education spending in period t +1( ht+1,c t+1,e t+1 respectively) to a change
in some model‘s parameters. As a consequence, a sensitivity analysis is called for
with regard to the above variables.10
Concerning ht+1,t h eF i g u r e5c o n ﬁrms the conclusions of Proposition 1 for
the whole range of parameter values used in our analysis. So, period t+1human
capital is a positive function of the extent of parental human capital-inclined
altruism (b) and the elasticities of human capital accumulation with respect to
individual-speciﬁc education expenditures (γ), net initial human capital (δ) and
public spending on economy-wide human capital (ζ).Also, future human capital
depends negatively on the elasticity of human capital formation with regard to
learning time (β).
As far as period t +1consumption and private education spending are con-
cerned, since they are positive functions of ht+1 by (6)-(7), they exhibit the same
relationship with b, γ, δ, ζ, β with period t +1human capital. The only pos-
sible exception is the dependence of ct+1 on b. This is because, as b rises, ht+1
increases, but the fraction in (6) declines. But as Figure 6 indicates, a higher
b, i.e stronger preference for education transfers to the young generation, implies
lower consumption. This is because as b increases, the weight on consumption
falls relative to the weight on education bequests, so optimal consumption falls.
10The tables corresponding to the sensitivity analysis of the endogenous variables and welfare
(see next section) are ommited due to space considerations. However, they are available from
the author upon request.
18Figure 5: Sensitivity of (ht+1,c t+1) wrt (b,γ,δ,ζ,β)

















































19As a result, an economy where parental altruism towards children‘s education
is stronger and/or the elacticities of human capital accumulation w.r.t the various
factors of education technology, except time devoted to learning, are higher than
in another econnomies will experience higher growth, but lower consumption.
5.3 Welfare
The analysis of the impact of a variation in the model‘s parameters on the policy
i n s t r u m e n t sa n dp r i v a t ev a r i a b l e sw o u l db ei n c o m p l e t ei fi tw a sn o tf o l l o w e db ya
welfare analysis. The latter is useful even in the context of a representative agent
model as ours, since it summarizes the eﬀects of changes in these parameters on
utility, which the social planner aims at maximizing through the use of the various
policy instruments.
Using the same range of values as before, i.e b ∈ [0.29,0.8],γ∈ [0.05,0.25],δ∈
[0.25,0.45],ζ∈ [0.05,0.25],β∈ [0.05,0.35] and ht =1 0 ,N=1 0 5, we present the
results in Figure 6. Welfare depends positively on the degree of parental altruism
towards the oﬀspring expressed via education transfers (b) and the elasticities of
human capital accumulation with respect to individual-speciﬁc education spending
(γ), net initial human capital (δ) and public education expenditures on economy-
wide human capital (ζ).
These ﬁndings are expected because the rise in education-inclined altruism is
higher proportionately than the fall of the weight given to consumption, inducing a
welfare improvement when b increases. Also, as each of the above three elasticities
gets higher human capital accumulation in period t +1 , therefore income, are
higher for given factors of production, so there is room for more consumption and
education expenditure in t +1 , both of which increase welfare.
Furthermore, a higher elasticity of human capital formation with regard to
learning time reduces welfare. This is because a higher β reduces human capital
20Figure 6: Sensitivity of welfare wrt (b,γ,δ,ζ,β)











































21in period t +1 , as mentioned above, implying a decline in consumption and/or
private education spending in t +1 ,b o t ho fw h i c hl o w e rw e l f a r e .
Therefore, societies where agents care more about their descendants‘ education
and the productive factors, except learning time, have a stronger impact on human
capital accumulation than others enjoy higher welfare.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we examined the implications in a general equilibrium setting of
two types of education policy, i.e education vouchers (EV) and public investment
on economy-wide human capital (GH). We focused on education policy, because
human capital accumulation is considered as a fundamental source of long-run
growth in modern economies and government intervention in education is wide-
spread. The objective was to determine the optimal allocation of tax revenues
between the two types of government spending and the associated tax rate sub-
ject to the symmetric competitive decentralized equilibrium in an environment
which allows for endogenous time devoted to education and takes into account
explicitly the parental altruism for children‘s education. This has not been ad-
dressed previously in the literature, although there are many papers studying the
eﬀects of human capital accumulation on growth.
We found that the optimal policy mix depends on the values of the model‘s
parameters and for the baseline parameter values it was shown that the govern-
ment should ﬁnance a high level of spending on economy-wide human capital by a
modest tax on initial human capital and a low tax on private education transfers.
According to the sensitivity analysis performed, the optimal allocation of tax
revenues depends on the relative productivity of the two types of expenditures
and the parental preference patameter over education transfers towards children.
Although it is diﬃcult to estimate the latter parameter, it would be interesting
22to compare various countries in that respect.
Regarding welfare, it was found that it depends positively on the elasticities of
human capital accumulation with respect to individual-speciﬁc education spend-
ing, economy-wide human capital and after-tax initial human capital and parental
preferences over children’s education.
We close with possible extensions. First, we could examine an economy where
the individuals in each generation are heterogeneous, allowing for more elaborate
education policies, e.g means-tested vouchers, which would allow us to study the
impact of education policies on income distribution. We might also assume the
more realistic case, where direct government education spending is not a pure
public good, but a public good subject to congestion. Furthermore, we might
study the case of progressive in addition to proportional taxation of initial human
capital and model uncertainty with respect to the characteristics of human capital
accumulation. We leave these extensions for the future.
23APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
The second-order suﬃcient conditions for the optimal economic policy are the
following:
f11 < 0
f11f22 − f12f21 > 0
where
f11 = −2τt+1k1 (γ + δ + ζ)+( γ + ζ)k1 −
b(δ + ζ)
1+b
f22 = −(γ + ζ)τt+1
f12 = −(γ + δ + ζ)τ
2
t+1 +( γ + ζ)τt+1
f12 = f21
These conditions hold for the benchmark values used in the analysis of the
paper, i.e b =0 .5,γ=0 .15,δ=0 .35,ζ=0 .15 and the respective values of the
policy instruments, τt+1 =0 .28,k 1 = −0.09.
APPENDIX B
Table B1. Sensitivity analysis of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G 1+1) wrt b
24bk 1 τt+1 vt+1 Gt+1
0.29 0.17 0.34 0.58 282200
0.38 0.06 0.31 0.19 291400
0.5 -0.09 0.28 -0.26 305200
0.64 -0.28 0.25 -0.7 320000
0.8 -0.5 0.22 -1.1 330000
Table B2. Sensitivity analysis of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G 1+1) wrt γ
γk 1 τt+1 vt+1 Gt+1
0.05 -1.4 0.15 -2.1 360000
0.1 -0.5 0.22 -1.1 330000
0.15 -0.09 0.28 -0.26 305200
0.2 0.14 0.33 0.47 283800
0.25 0.29 0.38 1.1 269800
Table B3. Sensitivity analysis of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G 1+1) wrt δ
δk 1 τt+1 vt+1 Gt+1
0.25 0.08 0.39 0.31 358800
0.3 0 0.33 0 330000
0.35 -0.09 0.28 -0.25 305200
0.4 -0.2 0.24 -0.48 288000
0.45 -0.33 0.2 -0.66 266000
Table B4. Sensitivity analysis of (k1,τt+1,v t+1,G 1+1) wrt ζ
ζk 1 τt+1 vt+1 Gt+1
0.05 0.2 0.15 0.3 120000
0.1 0 0.22 0 220000
0.15 -0.09 0.28 -0.25 305200
0.2 -0.14 0.33 -0.46 376200
0.25 -0.18 0.38 -0.68 448400
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